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Abstract
A cornerstone of effective disease surveillance programs comprises the early identification of infectious threats and
the subsequent rapid response to prevent further spread. Effectively identifying, tracking and responding to these
threats is often difficult and requires international cooperation due to the rapidity with which diseases cross
national borders and spread throughout the global community as a result of travel and migration by humans and
animals. From Oct.1, 2008 to Sept. 30, 2009, the United States Department of Defense’s (DoD) Armed Forces Health
Surveillance Center Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (AFHSC-GEIS) identified
76 outbreaks in 53 countries. Emerging infectious disease outbreaks were identified by the global network and
included a wide spectrum of support activities in collaboration with host country partners, several of which were in
direct support of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005). The network
also supported military forces around the world affected by the novel influenza A/H1N1 pandemic of 2009. With
IHR (2005) as the guiding framework for action, the AFHSC-GEIS network of international partners and overseas
research laboratories continues to develop into a far-reaching system for identifying, analyzing and responding to
emerging disease threats.
Background
A central objective of disease surveillance systems is the
early identification of infectious disease outbreaks to
facilitate rapid implementation of effective control mea-
sures for minimizing disease transmission and morbid-
ity. Although outbreak response has come a long way
since John Snow’s investigation of cholera and the
Broad Street pump in 19th century London [1], effective
outbreak response continues to be challenging. Today, a
particular challenge is the interconnected nature of our
global society. Diseases cross international borders and
present themselves in unique ways through a continu-
ously changing landscape, making it difficult to rapidly
identify, analyze and respond to disease outbreaks.
Appropriate and effective monitoring of newly recog-
nized disease clusters requires an established,
standardized and well-maintained global surveillance
system with a flexible framework for identifying and
responding to such events.
In 1997, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) estab-
lished the Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and
Response System (GEIS) in response to the Presidential
Decision Directive NSTC-7, which identified the need
for more robust global disease surveillance [2]. In 2008,
GEIS was integrated into the newly formed Armed
Forces Health Surveillance Center [3]. As the name
implies, the primary mission of AFHSC-GEIS is global
disease surveillance and response. A large portion of
this mission is accomplished through DoD overseas
research laboratories, which were initially established
within partner host countries to conduct research on
infectious diseases of bilateral concern [4]. This capacity
has subsequently been leveraged by AFHSC-GEIS for
the purpose of disease surveillance and response.
Currently, five DoD overseas research laboratories
serve in this capacity: the Armed Forces Research
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Thailand; the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Kenya
(USAMRU-K) in Nairobi, Kenya; the U.S. Naval Medical
Research Center Detachment (NMRCD) in Lima, Peru;
the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No. 2 (NAMRU-2)
in Jakarta, Indonesia; and the U.S. Naval Medical
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tionally, the AFHSC-GEIS network includes substantial
contributions from three U.S.-based research laboratories
and a major regional medical center in Europe. The
Naval Health Research Center (NHRC) in San Diego,
California, conducts population-based surveillance
among basic military trainees at eight of the 10 major
training centers in the United States; disease surveillance
among shipboard service members in the 2
nd (Atlantic),
3
rd (Pacific), and 7
th (Far East) U.S. Naval fleets; and
infectious disease surveillance in six clinics and two hos-
pitals along the United States-Mexico border [in colla-
boration with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and the County of San Diego Health
Department]. The U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace
Medicine (USAFSAM) in San Antonio, Texas, which
serves as the Air Force’s clinical reference laboratory and
public health center, is the lead organization for the U.S.
military’s installation-based, influenza sentinel surveil-
lance program. The Walter Reed Army Institute of
Research’s Division of Viral Diseases (WRAIR-DVD) in
Silver Spring, Md., provides full-length genomic sequen-
cing capability and conducts surveillance among U.S.
civilians assigned to Department of State embassies over-
seas. Additionally, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center
(LRMC) and the United States Army Public Command
Health Region-Europe (PHCR-Europe) in Landstuhl,
Germany, function as a regional military medical center
and support surveillance for respiratory pathogens and
other emerging infectious diseases (EID) within the U.S.
European Command. Additionally, AFHSC-GEIS has
been a member institution and contributing partner in
the WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response
Network since 1999.
Rapid identification of outbreaks and support of timely
response efforts are key components of complying with
the World Health Organization’s( W H O )I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Health Regulations (IHR) (2005), and are core focus
areas and strategic goals of the AFHSC-GEIS network
[5]. Support for these efforts, provided in response
to host country requests for assistance with new or
ongoing outbreaks, consists of a wide range of functions,
such as field team support, epidemiology or consultative
support, and laboratory diagnostic support. These efforts
and collaborative exchanges strengthen relationships,
build and maintain trust, and are a critical component
of the long-standing relationships between the network
partners and their sponsor host countries. Many of the
partnerships between the United States and host coun-
try militaries (mil-mil) partnerships that have developed
over the years have served to empower the host country
military’s role in supporting outbreak response activities
within their own countries [6].
In late 2006, Chretien et al., provided a detailed break-
down of how the broad-ranging DoD’s global disease sur-
veillance network could potentially serve as a model for
other global public health entities to adequately identify
and respond to these complex threats [7]. This paper
describes how the AFHSC-GEIS network has significantly
contributed toward effective outbreak identification and
response and capacity building within partner host coun-
tries [8] under the guiding principles of the WHO’sI H R
(2005) [9]. For clarity and for the purposes of this assess-
ment, we will describe the accomplishments of the
AFHSC-GEIS network during fiscal year 2009 (Oct. 1,
2008 through Sept. 30, 2009) through two categories:
respiratory disease outbreaks and non-respiratory EID
outbreaks.
Accomplishments
General
The AFHSC-GEIS network responded to 76 outbreaks
(Table 1, Figure 1) in 53 countries during the 2009 fiscal
year (FY09), several in direct support of the IHR (2005).
The most common diseases investigated were influenza
(47), cholera (four), dengue fever (four) and hepatitis
(three). Human disease was present in all but one of
these outbreaks, and specific causative agents were iden-
tified in 69 (92 percent) of them. The population affected
ranged from less than 10 individuals to several thousand,
and support efforts were often ongoing engagements
beyond the initial investigation. The type of population
supported also varied, depending on the relationship and
t h en a t u r eo ft h em i s s i o no fthe laboratory partner.
Thirty-six (48 percent) of the outbreak investigations
involved partners supporting civilian entities through for-
mal bilateral requests or as part of their role as a WHO
regional reference laboratory (NAMRU-3, AFRIMS and
USAMRU-K). In the majority of these instances, testing
of samples from civilian populations was performed.
Twenty-four (32 percent) of the partner responses
involved outbreaks among U.S. troops stationed in the
continental United States (CONUS) or at overseas loca-
tions, while 15 (20 percent) of the responses involved
investigations in collaboration with foreign military part-
ners and multinational forces involved in peacekeeping
activities or exercises. One investigation involved influ-
enza testing of U.S. expatriates through the U.S. Embassy
clinic in Jakarta, Indonesia.
Response activities included a range of efforts from
the provision of simple consultative services to com-
prehensive outbreak packages that included field
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diagnostic support. In 27 (36 percent) of the outbreaks,
personnel were provided for field support, 44 (59 per-
cent) outbreaks received epidemiologic or clinical con-
sultative support, and laboratory diagnostic and testing
support was provided to 68 (91 percent) of the out-
break support requests. Many AFHSC-GEIS partner
responses were a combination of the above and
27 (36 percent) of the outbreak investigations provided
af u l l yc o m p r e h e n s i v er e s p o n s ee f f o r tw i t hs u p p o r t
from all three categories.
Respiratory disease outbreaks
Beginning in 2006, the DoD’s global disease surveillance
network has worked to enhance the existing surveillance
infrastructure to prepare for a potential influenza pan-
demic. The goals of these expansion efforts included
broadening the network to monitor and detect increas-
ing numbers of avian (H5N1) influenza outbreaks
around the world and identify new infectious disease
threats [10]. This expansion of capacity and function
was both appropriate and fortuitous as AFHSC-GEIS
network partners at NHRC and USAFSAM were the
first in the world to detect the novel influenza A/H1N1
strain in April 2009 in San Diego, California, and San
Antonio, Texas. This rapid detection during the end of the
influenza season allowed the appearance of this novel
strain to be identified and reported as a Public Health
Emergency of International Concern by the CDC, a WHO
Table 1 Diseases and agents investigated throughout
2009 among AFHSC-GEIS global partner laboratories and
institutions
Disease or Agent Number of Outbreaks
Adenovirus 1
Campylobacter 1
Chikungunya 1
Cholera 4
Cyclospora 1
Dengue fever 4
Hepatitis (viral) 3
Influenza
Pandemic (2009) H1N1 42
Seasonal Influenza 4
Avian Influenza (H5N1) 2
Malaria 1
Norovirus 1
Rickettsiosis 1
Rift Valley fever 1
Salmonella typhi 1
Group A Streptococcal (GAS) pneumonia 1
Syphilis 1
Unknown etiology
Conjunctivitis 1
Gastrointestinal syndrome 2
Respiratory syndrome 1
Hemorrhagic syndrome 1
Vampire bat bites 1
Total 76
Figure 1 Global Snapshot of Emerging Infectious Diseases and Respiratory Diseases Outbreaks. October 2008 to September 2009.
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With the onset of this influenza A/H1N1 pandemic in
April 2009, substantial efforts were made by AFHSC-GEIS
network partners to assist the global health community in
responding to this threat. Fifty-one (67 percent) of the
76 outbreaks responses involved respiratory diseases,
4 1( 8 0p e r c e n t )o fw h i c hw e r ed u et on o v e li n f l u e n z a
A/H1N1.
Beginning in April 2009, with the onset of the influ-
enza pandemic, disease surveillance and investigative
support activities were dominated by novel influenza
A/H1N1-related responses. As with other investigations,
the activities for novel influenza A/H1N1 were wide-
ranging and involved different populations and situations.
The AFHSC-GEIS network supported the diagnostic
confirmation (directly in DoD lab or through support of
host-country laboratories) of the first cases in 14 coun-
tries (Bhutan, Cambodia, Colombia, Djibouti, Ecuador,
Egypt, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Lebanon, Nepal, Peru, Republic of the Seychelles and the
United States), again demonstrating direct support for
increasing compliance with IHR (2005). The non-U.S.
activities were a result of the respective AFHSC-GEIS
partner laboratory’s roles as regional reference testing
centers and the bilateral collaborations with host-country
Ministries of Health. These bilateral relationships
resulted in support of 17 large-scale outbreaks among
civilians in 13 countries.
U.S. service members and beneficiaries were affected
by the pandemic from the beginning. In the first wave
(April through August 2009), AFHSC-GEIS network
partners actively investigated 18 different outbreaks on
U.S. military installations and among previously defined
high-risk groups [11]. These high-risk groups included
deployed or deploying personnel, shipboard personnel,
new accessions (basic and advanced military trainees
and service academy students), health care workers,
children and staff in daycare centers, and pregnant
women. Stressful military environments, highly mobile
missions and complex troop dynamics helped to propa-
gate pandemics in the past and have drawn the atten-
tion of the military’s operational leadership and leaders
of civilian sectors within host countries. These investi-
gations involved from a few dozen cases to more than
1,000 cases tested.
Shipboard investigations involved a number of
responding units and included ships at sea in the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the Persian Gulf, as well
as vessels in port in major cities around the world.
Shipboard investigations have benefitted from the
ongoing surveillance of respiratory disease on large U.S.
Navy ships [12]. Patients meeting the case definition of
febrile respiratory illness (FRI), temperature > 100.4°F
and cough or sore throat, undergo throat swabs and the
specimens are stored in liquid nitrogen or -80°C freezers.
This surveillance, conducted by NHRC, has facilitated
timely specimen collection and pathogen identification in
a number of shipboard respiratory outbreaks in recent
years. The surveillance system detects a wide variety of
circulating influenza types as these ships make numerous
worldwide port stops over a short time period. In general,
the specimens are saved and processed at the end of a
ship’s deployment, which usually lasts six months. How-
ever, in the case of an outbreak, febrile respiratory illness
(FRI) specimens from immediately before the outbreak
onward can be processed onboard the ship with specific
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing or shipped over-
night to NHRC for 12- to 24-hour turnaround molecular
testing and culture.
Shipboard investigations ranged from simple identifi-
cation of the novel influenza A/H1N1 virus to detailed
epidemiologic investigation and testing [13]. NMRCD,
in partnership with the Peruvian Navy, investigated a
shipboard outbreak in June through July 2009 aboard a
355-crew Peruvian Navy ship at sea in the Pacific
Ocean. During the four-week investigation, team mem-
bers confirmed 78 of 85 (92 percent) febrile acute
respiratory illness cases as novel influenza A/H1N1. The
attack rate aboard the ship during the time of the out-
break was 22 percent. Early detection, through an active
shipboard surveillance system modeled on the NHRC
program, played an important role in the rapid detection
and subsequent control of the outbreak [14].
The USS Boxer (LHD 4), with a complement of more
than 2,200 U.S. Sailors and Marines, was docked at
Phuket, Thailand, from June 23 through 29, 2009. On
June 30, four of 14 patients with ILI tested positive for
influenza A by PCR. By July 9, 102 individuals had pro-
vided respiratory specimens (throat swabs in viral trans-
port media) that were sent to NHRC, where 69 were
confirmed as novel influenza A/H1N1. Overall, more
than 200 cases were identified in a five-week period and
177 personnel were isolated with FRI for an average
duration of 3.6 days (Figure 2) [15].
As part of the deployment process, troops usually
transition through pre-deployment training at what the
U.S. Army refers to as power projection platforms
(PPP). These are usually large installations with thou-
sands of individuals transferring to the deployed setting
each year [16]. The first wave of novel influenza
A/H1N1 included outbreaks among deploying service
members from nine of the 15 PPPs and subsequently
resulted in two large-scale outbreaks in the operational
theatre (Iraq and Kuwait). The most notable PPP out-
breaks were at Fort Riley, Kansas (n=33), Fort Hood,
Texas (n=44), Fort Lewis, Washington (n=144), and
Fort Bliss, Texas (n=188). Response activities at each
of the PPPs varied based on the reality on the ground
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large numbers of individuals in the latter stages of pre-
deployment were forced to take much more aggressive
steps to screen and monitor the symptoms of illness for
departing troops.
Military service academies were particularly hard hit
by novel A/H1N1 outbreaks during the first wave. Nota-
ble outbreaks requiring outside assistance and support
took place at the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) [17]
(Figure 3), U.S. Coast Guard Academy, U.S. Military
Academy and U.S. Naval Academy. Response efforts
ranged from diagnostic support for cadets and midship-
men in isolation to comprehensive outbreak support.
The response effort for USAFA was unique because it
was the first to provide information on the different
aspects of the disease in such a high-risk setting. The
USAFA investigation team conducted retrospective and
prospective surveillance to describe the epidemiology of
the outbreak and to define and implement effective con-
trol measures. Extensive education and hygiene efforts
were implemented and ill cadets were isolated from
non-ill cadets to decrease transmission. The team docu-
mented confirmed (n=134) and suspected (n=34) novel
influenza A/H1N1 cases among basic cadet trainees,
with an outbreak period incidence rate of 11 percent.
The peak of the outbreak occurred on July 6 and was
likely propagated by a Fourth of July social-mixing event
(Figure 4). The investigation team obtained serial nasal
wash samples from patients and published the first
report of virus shedding duration determined by virus
culture. Follow-up nasal wash samples taken seven days
from illness onset and from asymptomatic patients
(≥24 hours) contained cultureable virus in 24 percent
and 19 percent of the samples, respectively. The USAFA
investigation made a significant and novel contribution
to the general public health knowledge on the transmis-
sion dynamics of this disease and demonstrated a high
proportion of asymptomatic, sub-clinical disease among
cadets in this setting.
Remarkably, while notable novel influenza A/H1N1-
related outbreaks occurred at all of the basic military
training centers, overall, military recruits were only
minimally affected during the first wave of the pandemic
(Figure 5). Subsequently, the burden of disease shifted
almost entirely to recruits at these installations in early
fall (August-October) 2009, although the disease burden
of novel influenza A/H1N1 among recruits during the
entire time was significantly smaller than the ongoing
epidemic of adenovirus respiratory diseases among U.S.
military recruits [18].
In addition to the novel influenza A/H1N1 outbreaks,
four seasonal influenza outbreak investigations were
undertaken: one among deployed U.S. troops in Djibouti,
one in a refugee camp in Nepal, one onboard a U.S. Navy
submarine, and one among newly arrived Japanese
military trainees in Camp Pendleton, California.
Two H5N1-related investigations occurred, along with an
ongoing investigation of human H5N1 cases in Egypt and
assistance with human testing during an outbreak of influ-
enza in birds in Nepal in November of 2008. Additionally,
two respiratory illness outbreak investigations occurred
among basic military trainees, while the U.S. Army Public
Figure 2 Epi curve of cases, isolated patients during A/H1N1 outbreak aboard the USS Boxer. Summer 2009.
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of Group A Streptococcus at Fort Leonard Wood,
Missouri. An adenovirus type B14 was investigated at the
U.S. Coast Guard Training Center in Cape May, N.J. Both
outbreaks took place in March 2009 and were supported
by the laboratory at NHRC.
Overall, the AFHSC-GEIS global disease surveillance
network response remained strong through the end of
the first wave and well into the second fall wave of the
pandemic. At that point, efforts across the network pri-
marily shifted from outbreak response to systematic sur-
veillance (monitoring and representative sampling) of
affected sites, along with more complex characterization
of the viruses and close tracking of the global circulation
patterns of all influenza viruses.
Non-respiratory, emerging infectious disease outbreaks
The AFHSC-GEIS EID surveillance program includes five
program pillars or disease focus areas: respiratory diseases,
febrile and vector-borne illnesses, enteric diseases, sexually
transmitted infections and antimicrobial resistant
organisms. Outbreaks involving all five pathogen/illness
categories occurred in the one-year timeframe of this
report. Global surveillance network partners responded to
20 outbreaks involving non-respiratory EIDs where the
disease agents were identified, including four dengue fever,
four cholera, three viral hepatitis, two gastrointestinal syn-
drome, and one each of Campylobacter,c h i k u n g u n y a ,
Cyclospora, malaria, Norovirus, rickettsiosis, Rift Valley
fever, Salmonella typhi and syphilis. Additionally, partners
conducted individual outbreak investigations of conjuncti-
vitis and viral hemorrhagic syndrome, while one response
activity examined bites from vampire bats. Overall, these
response activities took place in 14 countries.
From May to September 2009, a diarrheal disease out-
break occurred in western Nepal, with reports of nearly
70,000 patients treated and over 350 deaths. The National
Public Health Laboratory of the Ministry of Health and
Population for Nepal requested assistance from the Walter
Reed/AFRIMS Research Unit Nepal (WARUN) in deter-
mining the etiology. WARUN received 158 stool samples
from eight districts in western Nepal; 45 percent from
Figure 5 A/H1N1 epi curve, timeline for outbreaks and clusters among U.S. service members and beneficiaries.
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WARUN in Nepal and AFRIMS in Thailand analyzed the
samples using real-time PCR and culture. Eighty-two of
the outbreak samples were positive for Vibrio cholerae
(01/0139) by PCR. Many of the PCR positive samples sub-
sequently grew V. cholerae serogroup 01 serotype Ogawa
in culture. Antibiotic sensitivity analysis of the V. cholera
isolates showed universal resistance to nalidixic acid,
colistin, streptomycin, sulfisoxazole, and trimethoprim/
sulfamethoxazole but sensitivity to the commonly recom-
mended antibiotics azithromycin, ciprofloxacin, ampicillin
and tetracycline. The National Public Health Laboratory
performed the initial culture on these stool samples, and
the WARUN and AFRIMS laboratories eventually verified
and confirmed the cause of the outbreak. The effort
enabled local health authorities to institute appropriate
treatment and prevention measures in a timely manner.
Department of Defense resources have also been
directed toward the investigation or characterization of
other phenomena that may threaten public health other
than the disease incidence. For example, AFRIMS and
NAMRU-2 investigators were among the first worldwide
to recognize that increases in Plasmodium falciparum
treatment failures to the powerful artemisinin combina-
tion therapies signaled the onset of resistance to the last
remaining class of malaria treatments in widespread
deployment today. As a result of these findings, world-
wide efforts are under way to contain spread of drug-
resistant forms of the parasite from what is hoped to be
a relatively constrained area in Southeast Asia along the
Thai-Cambodian border [19].
Although many methods may be used to detect out-
breaks, most often an astute clinician or laboratory
worker identifies an unusual occurrence or an increased
frequency. However, syndromic or electronic surveil-
lance may serve as another method to augment, but not
replace, traditional disease surveillance efforts [8].
AFHSC-GEIS partners at NMRCD have implemented a
near real-time electronic disease surveillance system
based on highly cost-effective and sustainable strategies
affordable in resource-constrained, developing countries.
This system is called Alerta and was first implemented
in the Peruvian Navy population in 2002, the Peruvian
Army three years later and more recently the Peruvian
Air Force. Currently, Alerta covers 98 percent, 99 per-
cent and 95 percent of the Peruvian Navy, Army and
Air Force population, respectively, and receives over
200 notifications per week. The system has been useful
in outbreak detection, identifying over 20 outbreaks in
the last year, six of which were for influenza. Eighty-six
reporting units operate nationwide, including border
units, hospitals, infirmariesa n ds h i p si n c o r p o r a t e di n
the Peruvian Navy surveillance system. Due to this pre-
vious experience, the Peruvian Army’se x p a n s i o nh a s
been faster, currently receiving reports from 120 units
throughout the country.
Within the one-year period of review, the 76 outbreaks
identified by the AFHSC-GEIS network spanned the
clinical disease spectrum and involved efforts of interna-
tional significance. The U.S. DoD has established a
robust and flexible global response framework through
open collaborations with long-standing host country
partners, other global health institutions and agencies
such as the WHO, the CDC and Institute Pasteur. In
doing so, AFHSC-GEIS, through its global network of
partners, is addressing the specific milestones for build-
ing sustained capacity for early detection and rapid
response as prescribed by the IHR (2005).
Conclusions
The Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center’s Division of
Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response Sys-
tem continues to expand internationally to effectively iden-
tify and respond to threats from a wide range of disease
agents and geography. The growth and enhancement of
this surveillance system in anticipation of pandemic/avian
influenza allowed the DoD to identify the current influenza
pandemic [20,21] and a number of other infectious disease
outbreaks in communities throughout the globe. A multi-
purpose system with defined goals and pillars of focus, the
AFHSC-GEIS network has evolved to become a true model
for emerging infectious surveillance platforms at the local,
regional and international level. By utilizing this established
global system, the DoD is able to provide a common and
systematic approach to disease surveillance and a frame-
work for effective response. As emerging and re-emerging
threats develop in areas where partners work collabora-
tively with host countries and global health institutions, the
AFHSC-GEIS network stands ready to respond.
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